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An Eye For a Wetland? Exploring Retribution
As a Theory of Environmental Sentencing
Paul A. Gillan Jr.

Of late, the great hue and cry among legislators and
politicians is for greater penalties to be imposed upon
environmental criminals. Criminal penalties for acts
such as polluting the waters of the United States have
existed for well over one hundred years,l yet it is only
the last decade that has seen significant development in
the enforcement of environmental statutes through
criminal penalties. Indeed, the case considered to be the
first "environmental crime" case, United States v.
Frezzo Brothers,2 was decided only fifteen years ago. 3
Relative to other crimes, environmental crimes are
comparatively young.
Despite its youth, the area of environmental crimes
has developed into an established part of the criminal
justice system. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Manual, for example, devotes an entire section to the
sentencing of environmental crimes. 4 Currently, the
environmental section covers only the sentencing of
individual crimes. The Sentencing Commission's first
attempt at developing a parallel section for corporate
offenders met with such opposition that the proposed
section was immediately withdrawn. 5
Incidents such as the failure ofthe corporate guidelines proposal illustrate the heightened tension associated with the sentencing of environmental crimes. The
public demands that environmental criminals be punished with a heavy hand. 6 Conversely, businesses
complain of intrusion into day-to-day management, the
hindrance of compliance, and the increasing willingness
ofcourts to pierce the corporate veil, exposing directors
and officers to personal liability.
The debate over the harshness of environmental
criminal penalties centers around the deterrence factor
of criminal sanctions. In fact, deterrence has been cited
almost exclusively as the dominant theory behind envi-

ronmental sentencing. 7 Other theories of sentencing
such as rehabilitation, isolation, and retribution have
not been addressed.
The purpose of this article is to explore retribution
as a viable theory in the sentencing of environmental
crimes. Part I provides a brief overview of current
methods of imposing environmental sanctions. Part II
discusses deterrence as the main theory behind environmental sentencing and explains why the exclusive use of
deterrence leaves theoretical gaps in sentence justification. Part III explores retribution as a theory of
sentencing, and Part IV briefly discusses one possible
counter-argument to the theory in section three. The
article concludes by recognizing a societal obligation to
explore retribution as a justification for environmental
sentencing.

I. Current Environmental Sentencing Procedures:
The Statutes and the Guidelines
Most of the major environmental statutes8 have
provisions for the imposition of criminal sanctions. 9
The complexity of the criminal violation section varies
from statute to statute. The content of each section
correlates both with the nature of the statute (advisory
v. regulatory), and with the nature of the substance or
acts governed.
On the least complex end of the continuum is the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) provision. The
statute simply provides that anyone who "knowingly or
willfully" violates the provisions of TSCA shall be
subject to a fine of up to $25,000 for each day of
violation and imprisonment ofnot more than one year. 10
On a more complex level is the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The FIFRA
provisions describe various levels offines depending on
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the person or business that is regulated. Producers))
who violate FIFRA face fines of up to $50,000 and one
year in prison.)2 Commercial applicators)3 may be
assessed up to $25,000 in criminal fines and one year in
prison. )4 Private applicators)5 are least threatened, with
potential penalties ranging from fines of $1,000 to up
to thirty days in prison. )6
The Clean Water Act (CWA) is an example of the
most comprehensive and complex environmental criminal penalty statutes. Criminal activity under the CWA
is divided into three groups: negligent violations,
knowing violations, and knowing endangerment.
For negligent violations, a first-time offender faces
a maximum penalty of fines ranging from $2,500 to
$25,000 for each day ofthe offense or imprisonment for
up to one year. )7 For a subsequent conviction under this
section, an individual faces a fine of up to $50,000 or
imprisonment for up to two years.)8
For knowing violations, the amount of the penalty
is substantially higher. First-time offenders may be
assessed fines ranging from $5,000 to $50,000 per day
of violation and up to three years in prison.)9 Repeat
offenders risk fines of up to $100,000 and six years in
prison. 20
Knowing endangerment involves, through a violation of the regulatory provisions of the CWA, placing
another individual "in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury."2) A person convicted under this
section may be fined up to $250,000 and faces imprisonment for as long as fifteen years. A business convicted under this section may be fined up to $1,000,000.
For repeat offenders, the penalties are doubled both as
to fines and as to jail time. 22
Like the CWA, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) has a knowing endangerment
provision. Both statutes provide limitations as to what
is considered "knowing," and detail the affirmative
defense that the endangerment was a "reasonably foreseeable hazard[] of an occupation, a business, or a
profession; or medical treatment or medical or scientific
experimentati on. "23
All of the statutes mentioned above are federal
statutes. Accordingly, violations are prosecuted in
federal courts, and are subject to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
The Guidelines were created to ensure honesty,
uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing24 and operate on a numerically-oriented basis. Offenses are
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assigned a certain number, the "base level offense"
value, which undergoes a series of calculations to arrive
at a final number. That number is then plugged into a
chart to determine the possible sentence range. The
higher the number, the greater the minimum and maximum allowable sentence.
The sentencing procedure is best illustrated by
example. Assume a manufacturer is convicted under
RCRA25 of one count of habitually dumping a mercuric
compound wash on his own property. The manufacturer accomplished this "disposal" by ordering his night
maintenance employee to carry the compound out in a
bucket and spread it around in some tall grass near a
fence. This process continued for about eleven or
twelve years.
The RCRA violation would be sentenced under
section 2Q 1.2 of the Guidelines, which applies to
mishandling of hazardous substances. Section 2Q 1. 2
includes "specific offense characteristics," and under
section 2Q1.2(b)(I)(A), the court may increase the
sentencing level number "[i]fthe offense resulted in an
ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge, release or
emission. "26
The court would then consider any "adjustments"
under chapter three of the Guidelines. Section 3B 1.1 (c)
provides for an increase in the sentencing level number
ifthe defendant was an "organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor" in the criminal activity. Here, because the
defendant exercised "decision-making authority," the
offense level would be increased by twO. 27
Finally, because the defendant had been dumping
the hazardous substance for a considerable length of
time, the court may consider making a "guided departure" of up to two additionallevels. 28 Factors that may
influence the court to make a guided departure include
the harm resulting from the activity, the quantity and
nature of the substance involved, the duration of the
offense, and the risk associated with the violation.
The final number is plugged into a chart to determine the sentencing range. In the hypothetical posed;
even if the defendant fell into the lowest category, that
is, the category with the least amount of past criminal
conduct, the court would be obligated to impose a jail
term of between twenty-seven and thirty months in
length. 29 Although the judge mayor may not impose
criminal fines, the imposition of the jail term is mandatory.
Two decades ago such a stiff sentence would have

been unheard of Yet as the importance of preventing
environmental violations continues to increase, both the
sentences imposed and the potential sentences continue
to increase as well. As section two more thoroughly
illustrates, this step in the evolution of the environmental sentence has been attributed largely to the deterrent
effect of increased penalties.

on the principle that "he who sees [the first man]
punished" will be deterred from committing a crime for
fear of meeting the same fate. 33 The thrust behind both
subsets is that a wrong once "done" cannot be "undone"; under a deterrent theory of sentencing, the
principle to which we should most aspire is the prevention of future like crimes.
The newest theory of sentencing, rehabilitation,
II. Deterrence and the Need to Sentence Environ- arose in the early twentieth century. Under this docmental Criminals
trine, the purpose of punishment is primarily to reform
The premise that one convicted of a crime should be the criminal, or to "do something to, for or with the
"punished" is often taken for granted. The thought of defendant so that when the person's sentence is comfinding guilt is so closely associated with the imposition pleted ... the defendant ... will thereafter obey, not
of sanctions that we scarcely
disobey, thelaw."34 The goal of
consider the underlying rationale.
rehabilitation is, arguably, preWhy do we punish? The quesventing recurrence ofthe crime.
· .. as tile importance of
tion often goes unconsidered.
The distinction, however, is that
Centuries of ·thought and
rehabilitation focuses on the inpreventing environmental
several gifted thinkers have prodividual and not merely the
violations continues to
vided four answers. Generally,
cnme.
increase, botll tile sentencthe four objectives of criminal
Unlike a sentence based
es
imposed
and
the
potenpenalties are 1) deterrence, preon rehabilitation, a sentence
tial sentences continue to
venting both the sentenced indibased on pure deterrence is imincrease as well
vidual and other individuals with
posed so that the specific crime
the same propensities from comcommitted not recur, either by
mitting a crime; 2) isolation,
the sentenced defendant or by
separating the individual from
those who observe the execusociety either to protect society
tion of his punishment. 35 The
or to force the defendant into reflective meditation; 3) sentencing judge chooses a punishment with the goal of
rehabilitation, an institutional counteracting of the so- preventing recurrence of the crime. The rehabilitative
cial or psychological forces that caused the original sentence focuses specifically on the defendant, and asks
crime; and 4) retribution, pure punishment, an "eye for by what means the forces which caused this particular
an eye."30
defendant to commit a crime can be met and eradicated.
The chief means of implementing this philosophy of
Over time, emphasis has shifted among these four
theories in accordance with contemporary social thought. rehabilitation was the "indeterminate sentence." A
The earliest theory of sentencing was probably retribu- defendant convicted of a serious crime could face
tion. 31 Later thought, led principally by Plato, put offthe anywhere from one year to life in a correctional facility.
"unreasonable fury" inherent in retributive action and Once committed, the prisoner works his way toward
opted for the more rational justification of deterrence. release by earning credits for good behavior. 36 Bad
"[H]e who desires to inflict rational punishment ... is behavior earns demerits. 37 Upon the accumulation ofa
desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees certain number of credits, the prisoner is considered
him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong "rehabilitated" and released; the key to the prison door,
again."32
so to speak, is left in the prisoner's hands. Indeterminate
This statement illustrates the two main subsets of sentencing schemes, however, and rehabilitation with
deterrent theory: specific deterrence and general deter- them, fell into judicial disfavor. 38 Since the decline of
rence. Specific deterrence embodies the idea that "the rehabilitation as a primary goal, deterrence has once
man who is punished" will not repeat his crime for fear again assumed a position at the forefront of criminal
of being punished again. General deterrence operates sentencing theory.
______________________________ 2S.2/U. Bait.
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With respect to white-collar crimes, deterrence has
found particular favor among sentencing theorists.
Although the trend appears to be changing,39 whitecollar criminals have traditionally received light sentences. 4O So great was the historical pattern of leniency
that a white-collar defendant in 1975 challenged his
twenty-five year prison sentence on the basis of cruel
and unusual punishment. 41 There, the judge observed
that:
[a] minority of the prison population are rightfully
locked up because they are too dangerous to release. 42
Ifwe are to justify imprisonment for the rest, it must be
on the grounds ofpunishment or deterrence. And ifthis
is our premise, the white collar criminal must come to
expect equal or greater treatment than the common,
non-violent thief43
In sentencing the white-collar criminal, the judge found
a firm footing in the theory of deterrence.
The court underscored this theory when it stated, "I
doubt that deterrence will be very effective until the
'executive' becomes convinced that ifhe embarks on a
criminal adventure, he will be severely - though proportionately - punished. Certainty is the key."44 The court
upheld the twenty-five year prison term, indicating its
desire to provide some "certainty" to the arena of
white-collar sentencing. 45
With respect to sentencing ofenvironmental crimes,
deterrence has been the dominant underlying theory by
far. Those involved in the investigation and subsequent
prosecution of environmental crimes note the peculiar
stigma attached to a criminal charge. 46 The deterrent
effect of criminal prosecution is evidenced by such
statements as "I would starve before I would do it
again."47
Deterrence as a theory of sentencing is emphasized
not only by those who are prosecuted under environmental laws, but also by those who prosecute. 48 Academics as well have centered their attention on the
deterrent effect of environmental prosecutions. 49 Although acknowledging the existence of other sentencing theories, "the greatest emphasis in the environmental realm is placed on the deterrence effect a j ail sentence
has upon future potential violators."5o
Unfortunately, failure to acknowledge the retributive aspect of environmental prosecution results in a
kind of schizophrenia. On one hand, the government is
~~
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charging, prosecuting, and jailing environmental criminals in the same way that it is prosecuting and jailing
murderers, thieves, and rapists. At the same time, there
is no concomitant acknowledgment that the act committed is truly a "crime" that would invoke the principles of retribution. In other words, if deterrence is the
only theory upon which environmental sentencing is
based, the seriousness of environmental crime is reduced from the level of a "crime" to what may more
aptly be termed a violation.

ill. Retribution
Of the four theories of criminal sentencing, only
retribution operates retroactively. Each of the others
operates proactively, in that the effect is felt or aimed to
be felt either at the moment of sentencing or at some
point thereafter.
Deterrence, for example, has as its specifically
stated purpose the prevention of (1) recidivism on the
part of the criminal (specific deterrence) and (2) the
commission of like offenses by other criminals in the
future. Rehabilitation, though theoretically and practically distinguishable from pure deterrence, nonetheless
works towards the prevention of recidivism by removing the sociological and psychological influences that
drove the individual's initial acts. Isolation protects
society by incarcerating the criminal, thereby removing,
at least for a period oftime, the possibility that the same
criminal will commit further crimes.
None of these theories addresses the criminal act
itself They focus solely on the prevention of further
acts. Retribution, however, has as its sole focus punishment of the criminal for the crime committed, regardless of the criminal's potential to recidivate. The
principle is that of jus talionis, an eye for an eye,
retaliation. 51
Understanding the difference between sentencing
for deterrence and sentencing for retribution involves a
hair-splitting distinction between what is considered
"wrong" and what is considered "punishable."52 For
purposes of this argument, wrong and punishable may
be placed at opposite ends of a continuum of acts for
which any judgment may be imposed.
Wrong, on one end, covers purely administrative or
statutory violations, characteristically punishable by
fines, and construed to require a minimal amount ofdue
process prior to imposition. A parking violation, for
example, is nearly a pure wrong. The commission of a

--------------------------------

parking violation does little harm to society; thus, the of a crime even ifsatisfied that he is unlikely to commit
sole reason for imposing a parking fine is to deter further crimes."57 Implicit in Jones is the idea that
parking violators from recidivating and to deter others retribution alone may serve as the justification for a
from violating parking laws. 53
particular sentence.
Perhaps a better explanation of retribution is found
At the opposite end of the continuum are crimes
that are purely punishable. These crimes are rare, in Gregg v. Georgia. 58 In Gregg, the Supreme Court.
because in a majority of cases, crimes that are punish- quoted Williams v. New Yor!cS 9 for the proposition that
able under a retribution theory are punishable under a "[ r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the
deterrent theory as well. A sentence for murder, for criminallaw."60 However, the Court later stated, "but
example, demands not only that the crime be paid for, neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent
but also that a sentence be imposed that will deter others with our respect for the dignity of men. "61 The Court
recognized that the appropriateness of a sentence may
from committing the same crime. 54
Consider, however, the following scenario: B be determined by the community's belief as to what the
murders A, who is the only other human being in sentence should be. Quoting Lord Justice Denning, the
existence. B cannot recidivate, nor are there any others Court set forth the following passage in a footnote:
who can possibly commit the same crime. B cannot,
therefore, be sentenced under a deterrent theory, for Punishment is the way in which society expresses its
there are none to deter. Neither can B be sentenced denunciation of wrongdoing: and, in order to maintain
under an isolation theory, because there are none to respect for law, it is essential that the punishment
inflicted for grave crimes
protect from the possibility of
should adequately reflect the
B repeating his act. Finally,
A
crime
is
an
act
revulsion felt by the great
there is no sense in rehabilitatmaj ority ofcitizens for them.
ing B, for there is no longer a
against the community
It is a mistake to consider the
"society" in which B must live
as well as against the
objects of punishment as beand function normally.
victim. Thus the coming deterrent or reformative
Yet it would seem fitting to
munity, through the
or preventive and nothing
us, as nonexistent observers of
legislature, may dictate
else . . . .The truth is that
this scenario, if B were to do
what it considers the
some crimes are so outrasome type of penance -- inflict
geous that society insists on
some type of punishment upon
appropriate punishadequate punishment, behimself to "pay" for the crime
ment for the crime.
cause the wrongdoer dethat he committed. Failingthat,
serves it, irrespective of
we would desire that B be struck
by lightning, or fall and break a limb, or in some other whether it is a deterrent or not. 62
way be made to suffer. This is because we identify the
act of murder as wrong, and, more importantly, as This passage provides insight into the rationale behind
punishable under a purely retributionist theory. Were retribution as a theory of sentencing. A crime is an act
we to fail to acknowledge retribution as a possible against the community as well as against the victim.
justification for sentencing B, there would be no sen- Thus the community, through the legislature, may
dictate what it considers the appropriate punishment for
tence imposed whatsoever.
In Jones v. United States, 55 the United States Su- the crime.
Retribution has been acknowledged by Congress as
preme Court discussed the possible justifications for
a
legitimate
sentencing consideration. In determining
sentences and noted, "[a] particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view ofthe proper the sentence to be imposed, the sentencing judge must
response to commission ofa particular criminal offense, consider the need for the sentence "to reflect the
based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
deterrence, and rehabilitation. "56 The Court further law, and to provide just punishment for the offense."63
stated that "[t]he State may punish a person convicted The environmental sentencing statutes are part of the

very legislation that is based, in structure, on a
retributionist sentencing theory.
Therein lies the fundamental flaw in relying exclusively upon deterrence to justify the harshness of environmental criminal sanctions. To ignore the retributive
aspect of environmental sentencing is to ignore "the
seriousness ofthe offense." It is a failure "to promote
respect" for environmental law, and a failure to "provide just punishment for the offense" of environmental
crime. To ignore the demands of retributionist theory
is to ignore "the product of thousands of years of
history, culture, tradition, religion, and other societal
forces" embodied in retributionist theory.64
The result, as previously noted, is a schizophrenic
embrace of environmental sentencing statutes. We
impose criminal sanctions65 on individuals whom we do
not recognize as having committed "crimes" because
their acts do not invoke (or we have not yet recognized
them as invoking) the principles of retribution -- pure
punishment for the crime committed.
In United Statesv. Ellen,66 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a six-month
sentence imposed upon Ellen for violations ofthe Clean
Water Act. 67 Ellen argued that his sentence could not
stand unless his crime, destroying some eighty-six acres
of federally protected wetlands, could be considered a
"serious offense" under 28 U.S.C. § 9940).68 Upholding the sentence, the court noted that "[t]hrough the
Clean Water Act and other environmental laws, Congress has determined that harm to the environment even absent imminent threats to public health, welfare,
or safety - is a public policy concern of the greatest
magnitude. "69
The court observed that in the Clean Water Act,
"Congress determined that 'the restoration of the natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters is essential. '''70 Ignoring retribution as
a theory of environmental sentencing detracts from that
statement, because it fails to recognize the seriousness
that society, through the legislature, has assigned to
environmental crimes. It fails to recognize the inherent
wrong in abusing natural resources.
Ellen challenged his sentence, arguing that the
destruction of wetlands, a critical natural resource, was
not "an otherwise serious offense. "71 As the court aptly
noted, "[t]hat Ellen believes that an offense of this
magnitude is trivial or unimportant ironically exemplifies the need not to foreclose punishment by imprison-

ment in enforcing laws aimed at environmental protection."72 In this statement, the court implicitly recognized the need to convey to defendants the seriousness
ofthe offense, thereby affirming to society the integrity
of its laws.

IV. Recognizing Debate
One possible counter-argument to the above theory
is that if retribution has not been acknowledged as a
justification for environmental sentencing, it is because
society does not recognize environmental violations as
crimes that would invoke retributive principles. The
question then becomes whether a governing entity may
impose criminal penalties for violations that the general
population does not feel are "crimes." Though debatable, the answer must be resoundingly affirmative. If
the answer were always in the negative, the use of the
court system as an engine for effecting changes in
societal behavioral patterns would be impossible.
Apart from this theoretical response, however,
there is evidence to refute the counter-argument on a
factual basis as well. As early as 1970, polls indicated
that "most Americans consider pollution to be the most
serious problem facing their communities."73 In 1984,
Americans ranked environmental crimes seventh on a
list of serious crimes, ahead of heroin smuggling and
skyjacking.74 A Denver Post survey in 1989 concluded
that "environmental concerns would be one of the very
highest priorities for the 1990s. "75 One commentator
had this to say on whether environmental crimes deserve the strict penalty of prison terms:
A strong argument can be made that crimes against the
environment are more reprehensible than most "traditional" crimes. The damage wrought by pollution is
devastating, widespread, and will be present for generations. Countless individuals have suffered ill-health
and many have died as a result of pollution. These
crimes are coolly carried out in a premeditated and
methodical manner, motivated by the desire to make a
proftt. 76
It is this revulsion, felt by so many at the thought of
natural resources abuse, that demands retribution for
environmental crimes. It is this revulsion that the courts
must consider when imposing sentences in determining
the need for the sentence "to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to

provide just punishment for the offense." It is this available in WESTLAW, C868 ALI-ABA 1, at *6.
revulsion that demands a harsh sentence for environ- 4 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
mental crimes even when the deterrent factor is nonex- Manual, Section 2Q (1993) (hereinafter Guidelines).
5
The Sentencing Commission has since released a
istent. 77
new set ofproposed corporate guidelines. For their text,
V. Conclusion
see Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines for EnvironThe investigation and prosecution ofenvironmen- mental Violations, 24 [Current Developments] Env't
tal crimes has become an established part of our Rep. (BNA) at 1378 (Nov. 16, 1993).
criminal justice system. Within its scope fall hundreds 6 Norton, supra note 3, at *3-4.
of thousands of individuals, many college-educated, 7 The research for this paper, while not exhaustive,
family-type people wholly devoid of what is normally yielded no discussions of the retributive aspect of enviconsidered "the criminal element."
ronmental sentencing.
There can be few things in this world more devas- 8 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
tating than subjection to criminal process. And in these (FIF~), 7 U. S. C. § 136 (1988); Toxic Substances
days where the world is ever-shrinking, an individual to Control Act (TSCA), 15 US.c. § 2601 (1988); Endanwhom the stigma of prosecution has attached is ever gered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988);
more likely to have his trial revisited, well after the Clean Water Act (CWA) (formerly Federal Water Polpenalty has been paid and the wrong absolved.
lution Control Act), 33 US.c. § 1251 (1988); Marine
For these precise reasons, it is incumbent upon Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
society, the legislature, and the judiciary to explore (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988); and Resource
retribution as a theory of sentencing in environmental Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (formerly
crimes. For ifthere is truly no urge for retribution, no Solid Waste Disposal Act), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
revulsion at the abuse of natural resources, no need to 9 FIFRA § 14, 7 U.S.c. § 1361(b); TSCA § 16, 15
inflict punishment upon an environmental criminal for U.S.C. §2615(b);ESA§ 11, 16U.S.C. § 1540(b);CWA
the pure sake ofpunishing, then ourreliance on criminal § 309, 33 U.S.c. § 1319(c); MPRSA § 105,33 U.S.C.
sanctions to ensure environmental compliance is alto- § 1415(b); RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d); and
gether misplaced.
OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e)-(g).
\0
15 US.C. § 2615(b).
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or deposit any refuse matter of any kind or description 12 7 US.c. § 1361(b)(I)(A).
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a more thorough explanation, see Gary S. Licenberg,
Sentencing Environmental Crimes, 29 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1235 (1992). See also Jane Barrett, Sentencing
Environmental Crimes Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: A Sentencing Lottery, 22 Envtl. L.
1421 (1992).

See generally, Nicholas N. Kittrie & Elyce H.
Zenoff, Sanctions, Sentencing, AndCorrections (1981).
31
See id at 3 for a presentation of the pre-Biblical
Hammurabi Code. A few examples of the Code are
illustrative:
1.
If a man has laid a curse upon another
man, and it is not justified, the layer ofthe curse shall be
slain.
3.
If in a lawsuit a man gives damnatory
evidence, and his word that he has spoken is not
justified; then, if the suit be a capital one, that man shall
be slain.
193. If a son has struck his father, his hands
shall be cut off.
194. If a man has destroyed the eye of a free
man, his own eye shall be destroyed.
32
Id at 5.
33
The theory of general deterrence has met with
considerable opposition. Whether an individual should
be sentenced heavily to prevent others from committing
the same crime is an issue that raises deep moral
questions. Indeed, the fairness of such a theory has been
challenged, although unsuccessfully, on Eighth Amendment grounds. See United States v. Bergman, 416 F.
Supp. 496 (S.D.N. y. 1976). The crux ofthe argument
is that a defendant sentenced as an example to others is
paying a penalty for crimes that others have not yet
committed.
34
Kittrie & Zenoff, supra note 30, at 14 (citations
omitted).
35
See id at 12. As the authors note, "[a] judge who
is called upon to sentence a burglar should ordinarily be
considering the deterrent effect ofthe sentence ofthose
who are likely to become burglars." Id. at 12-13. The
focus of the sentence, at least for general deterrence,
necessarily includes persons other than the defendant.
36
The rehabilitative correctional curriculum includes
psychotherapy and ongoing professional mental evaluations.
37
One relevant issue not discussed here focuses on the
determination of "good" and "bad" behavior as it
relates to the prisoner's rehabilitation. For example,
giving demerits for failure to make one's bed necessarily
implies that making one's bed is characteristic of a
conforming social character. In essence, it implies that
good citizens make their beds (and obey laws) and bad
citizens do not make their beds (and break laws). The
logic of this argument is flawed, inasmuch as the
30
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making of one's bed has no rational bearing on one's
ability to obey society's criminal laws.
38
See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 537 P.2d 384 (Cal.
1975). The Supreme Court of California rested its
decision not on the facial invalidity of the State's
indeterminate sentencing statute, but on its operation.
Because a person convicted of a low-level felony could
potentially spend their entire life in prison, the California statute violated both the Eighth Amendment and
Article I, Section 17 of the Constitution which require
"that the punishment be proportionate to the offense."
Id. at 392. Cj Browder v. United States, 398 F. Supp.
1042, 1046 (D. Or. 1975), aff'd544F.2d 525 (9th Cir.
1976) ("Penology's recent enchantment with rehabilitation as a wholesale justification for imprisonment has
dissolved in the face of numerous studies proving that
rehabilitation rarely occurs.").
39
See, e.g., Martin J. Littlefield, Environmental Enforcement and the Criminal Justice System, ALI-ABA,
April 11, 1991, available in WESTLAW, C617 ALIABA 25. Littlefield notes a "dramatic increase in
[environmental] criminal prosecutions since 1985,"
from forty in that year to 130 in fiscal year 1990. Id. at
*30. The increase in prosecutions has been accompanied by an increase in the length of jail terms. While the
number of prosecutions tripled from 1985 to 1990, the
number of years sentenced increased nine-fold, from 5
years and 5 months in 1985 to 45 years and nine months
in 1990. Id
40
See Browder, 398 F. Supp. at 1046. Appealing a
harsh sentence for interstate fraud, Browder conducted
a study of 100 cases involving similar "white-collar"
crimes. Twenty percent ofthe defendants in Browder's
study received fines, the remainder received light sentences. Browder summed up his study by stating,
"wherein the greater the offense against capital, the
lesser the punishment." The reviewing court, however,
was unpersuaded by the argument, and upheld the 25
year sentence.
41
Id.
42
This is the fourth theory of sentencing, isolation,
which is not addressed directly in this paper. Discussion
was omitted because isolation, historically, was never
engaged by judges as a primary theory of sentencing.
Nonetheless, it warrants note that isolation plays a
significant role in many sentences, particularly where
the crime is a violent one.
43
Browder, 398 F. Supp. at 1046 (emphasis added).
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The converse of this argument is that a well-educated
defendant, most often surrounded by loving family and
a caring community, is essentially released into good
hands if given a light sentence. A defendant returned to
a good family instead of the department of corrections,
so the idea goes, will have more hands around him to
keep him straight if, or when, his intentions once again
run afoul of the law.
44
Id at 1047.
45
The opinion in Browder, authored by Judge Skopil
of the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon, comes down rather harshly on white collar
criminals:
The consequences of a white collar property crime tend
to reach a higher magnitude in direct proportion to the
level of status and power held by the criminal involved
. . . Edward Browder was convicted of pledging over
$500,000 worth of stolen securities. He concedes his
guilt for those crimes. The fact that they were accomplished by means of wit and charm rather than a burglar's tool does not minimize the damage done to the
public.
Id at 1046-47.
46
Criminal Enforcement ofEnvironmentalLaw Seeks
Deterrence Amid Need for Increased Coordination
Training, Public Awareness, 17 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 800, 802 (Sept. 26, 1986)
(hereinafter Enforcement of Environmental Law).
47
Norton, supra note 3, at *5. The statement apparently came from a General Electric official jailed for
price-fixing. Id
48
See Enforcement of Environmental Law, supra
note 46, at 802. E. Dennis Muchnicki, an Ohio environmental crime prosecutor, states, "We have had people
in corporations charged with an environmental crime
who say that they would pay almost any civil penalty if
we dropped the case." Id
49
See, e.g., Susan A. Bernstein, Environmental Criminal Law: The Use of Confinement for Criminal
Violators ofthe Federal Clean Water Act, 17 New Eng.
J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 107, at sec. IV "The
Impact of Confinement: Is it an Effective Deterrent?",
118-23 (1991).
50
Littlefield, supra note 39, at *33. See also Gregory
A. Bibler, Counseling the Client on Environmental
Crimes,Prac. Law., at 37, 40 July 1991, (citing an EPA
memorandum for the prospect that deterrence is a
"major value of criminal prosecution").
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Kittrie & ZenotT, supra note 30, at 40.
which prohibits the discharge "of any pollutant by any
Id at 39. Kant, in his Rechtslehre, posits that person" except as the discharge is allowed by a secured
"[one] must first be found guilty and punishable before permit, and § 1319(c)(2)(A), which subjects a person
there can be any thought of drawing from his punish- who knowingly violates § 1311 to a fine of between
ment any benefit for himself or his fellow-citizens." Id $5,000 and $50,000, a prison term of up to three years,
51

52

53
Even in this example there is a bit of "crime," in
that the commission of a violation involves disrespect
for the law. While the initial fine is imposed for deterrent
purposes alone, a history of ignoring parking tickets
indicates a disrespect for law that warrants imposition
of a criminal ( retributive) penalty as well.
54
There are also isolation theories here as well, i. e.,
that society should be protected from a dangerous
criminal.
55
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
56
Id at 368-69.
51
Id at 369 (emphasis added).
58
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
59
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
60
Gregg, 428 US. at 183 (quoting Williams, 337
US. at 248).
61
Id (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,39495 (1972) (Burger, C.l, dissenting).
62
Id at 184 n. 30 (quoting Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Dec. 1,
1949, p.207 (1950)). Although only a footnote, this
passage has received attention since it was written. See
Atiyehv. Capps, 449US. 1312, 1314(1981)(Rehnquist,
l, as Circuit Justice) (nothing in the Constitution says
"rehabilitation" is the sole permissible goal of incarceration, retribution is equally permissible).
63
18 US.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1988).
64
Kittrie & ZenotT, supra note 30, at 14.
65
Some debate exists as to where the line between
civil and criminal sanctions is most properly drawn. See,
e.g., Developments--Corporate Crime, 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 1227, 1370-71 (1979)(basic aim of civil sanctions
is deterrence; retribution is the province of criminal
law). See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
US. 144 (1963 ) (focusing on whether a given sentence
is primarily regulatory or punitive).
66
961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 217
(1992).
61
Ellen was convicted under 33 US.C. § 1311(a),

or both.
Ellen argued that the Guidelines section under
which he was sentenced, § 2Q 1. 3, was inconsistent with
the Guidelines' enabling legislation, 28 U. S. C. § 9940).
The enabling statute directed the Sentencing Commission to ensure that the Guidelines reflected "the general
appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than
imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first
offender who has not been convicted of a crime of
violence or an otherwise serious offense." Id at 46768 (emphasis added). Since Ellen was a first offender,
and his crime was not a "crime of violence," his
sentence would be consistent with § 9940) only iffilling
wetlands was "an otherwise serious offense." Id
69
Id at 468.
10
Id (quoting S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
7, reprinted in 1972 US.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674) (emphasis added). This holding has recently been reiterated
by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Strandquist,
993 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1993).
11
Ellen, 961 F.2d at 468.
68

12

Id

Norton, supra note 3, at *3.
Id
15
Id at *4.
16
Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements of the
Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Criminal LiabilityinSubstanceButNotForm, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 307,
319-20 (1988) (cited in Bernstein, supra note 49, at
13

14

120).
11
The efficacy of criminal prosecution as a deterrent
works against the imposition of stiff sentences for
deterrent purposes alone. Ifthe deterrent value is in the
prosecution, and the stigma attached to withstanding
criminal process, there is little need for a harsh sentence.
More aptly put, ifthe bark is sufficient, why the need for
bite? The answer must be to fulfill the societal need to
see criminals punished for their crimes, irrespective of
their potential to recidivate.
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